This paper examines the impact of military expenditure on economic growth on a large balanced panel, using an exogenous growth model and dynamic panel data methods for 106 countries over the period 1988-2010. A major focus of the paper is to consider the possibility group heterogeneity and non-linearity. Having estimated the model for all of the countries in the panel and finding that military burden has a negative effect on growth in the short and long run, the panel is broken down into various groupings based upon a range of potentially relevant factors and the robustness of the results is evaluated. The factors considered are different levels of income, conflict experience, natural resources abundance, openness and aid. The estimates for the different groups are remarkably consistent with those for the whole panel, providing strong support for the argument that military spending has adverse effects on growth. There are, however, some intriguing results that suggest that for certain types of countries military spending has no significant effect on growth.
Introduction
There is an impressively large and growing literature on the effects of military spending on economic growth that reflects a continuing lack of consensus. As more data becomes available that does not reflect the particular geopolitical environment of the Cold War, there is more information in the data, which should help researchers in identifying any relation with economic factors. Certainly, the end of the Cold War saw sizeable reductions in military expenditure internationally and in recent years the declining trend has bottomed out and military expenditure is once again on the increase, across the medium and high income groups. The lowest income group continues to experience declines in military spending and military spending as a share of GDP remains the lowest for the low income countries relative to the other income groups (SIPRI 2012) . SPIRI (2011) reported that world military expenditure in 2010 reached $1.6 trillion, representing 2.6 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or equivalent to $236 per person. While the end of the Cold War meant fewer major international conflicts, there was an increase in internal conflicts in the developing world and while the number of conflicts has been declining more recently, they remain a major concern for the developing world.
One issue that has received little attention has been the robustness of the parameter estimates of growth models across groups of countries. This paper contributes to the existing literature by continuing this investigation with a particular focus on parameter heterogeneity using a post Cold War balanced panel of 104 countries for 1988-2010. The next section briefly reviews the existing literature for developing countries and provides an exposition of the growth model based on Dunne et al (2005) , which includes military spending and overcomes some of the limitations of earlier models. Section 3 provides a discussion of the dataset. Section 4 presents the results of the estimated growth model using the cross country data and considers the variation in results across various subsamples when the sample is stratified by developed, non-developed; income groups (low, medium, high); conflict (conflict or not; civil, interstate); conflict and income groups; net recipients of aid; natural resources; and trade openness. The final section presents some conclusions.
Military Spending and Growth
It is important to have a theoretical model for empirical work, but since most economic theories do not have an explicit role for military spending there is no obvious choice. Indeed, as there is no agreed theory of growth among economists, there is no standard framework to fit military spending into. In most recent empirical work some form of neoclassical growth model has been used, exogenous or endogenous, to provide a consistent and flexible framework for the analysis (Dunne et al, 2005) . These will inevitably focus on particular aspects of the growth process and may miss complexities, such as the effect of institutions, natural resources, strategy, conflict etc.
The empirical debate over the relation between military expenditure and growth was started by the contributions of Benoit (1973 Benoit ( , 1978 which found positive association. This led to a large amount of research activity and an impressive build-up of literature that has tended not to support Benoit's initial findings. Opinions on the effects of military spending 3 are divided among two groups; the "pro" group that views military spending as a guarantee of peace, security and welfare, while the "against" group sees such spending as a wasteful enterprise that influences the economy beyond the resources it takes up. Although the effects of military expenditure have been debated for almost forty years, the answer is almost always an empirical one. Irrespective of which perspective one takes the topic of military expenditure is, most definitely, nontrivial; often leading to important economic consequences. A number of researchers have tried to survey the existing literature, Ram (1995) Dunne (1996) and Smith (2000) finding no empirical regularity, positive or negative, though Smith did indicate that there could be a small negative effect in the long-run, however, more sophisticated techniques are required to find such a relationship. Dunne and Uye (2010) in a survey of 102 studies on the economic effects of military spending show that negative effects of military spending on growth were reported in 39 and 35 percent of cross-country and case studies respectively. Only 20 percent found positive effects for both types, while over 40 percent found unclear results.
What is clear is past research has not been able to provided consensus on the economic effects of military spending, though more recent studies do seem to be providing more consistent support for a negative effect of military spending on growth (Dunne and Tian, 2013) . The more recent cross country studies have also should increasing concern over group heterogeneity, endogeneity and non-linearity. These include Smaldone (2006) who suggested that differences in results for Africa reflect countries' experience of conflict, Tiwari and Shabiz (2012) who considered non-linearities, Looney and McNab (2007) who considered economic freedom and governance and Dunne (2012) who allows for nonlinearity and conflict experience in SSA.
Following on from these contributions this paper estimates a growth model for the sample of 104 countries and then stratified into sub-samples to compare the results across income groups, developed and developing countries, conflict experience, civil wars and interstate wars, natural resource abundance, net recipients of aid and trade openness. This sample stratification method is used because firstly, the concern is with investigating the application of the specified theoretical growth model and secondly that many of the factors are invariant over time and so indicators could not be introduced as explanatory variables.
Conflict experience would seem to be an important potential source of heterogeneity. As mentioned Smaldone (2006) argued that military burden within Africa generally corresponds to the security realities and affects the relationship between military spending and growth. Dunne (2012) provides support to this claim. As is common in the literature conflict is defined here as having at least 25 combat-related deaths per year, but a cumulative battle death of over 1,000 throughout the duration of the conflict is also considered.
Natural Resource endowment has been investigated as having an impact on conflict and is a good candidate for a factor that might influence the relation between military spending and growth. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) found that where (rebellions/civil wars are motivated by greed) they primary commodity exports can substantially increases conflict risk. They argue that In the presence of natural resource abundance, opportunities arise through extortion 4 and looting of profits for those in control of the resource, thus making conflict/rebellion feasible or perhaps even attractive. Other research suggests similar hypotheses, Sarr et al (2011) explains that in a resource rich country, an unchecked ruler can use resources as collateral and facilitate acquisition of loans and loot the economy. Looting then leads to political instability and hence diminished growth. It certainly seems a reasonable to suggest that resource abundance countries may differ in their relation between military spending and growth and following conventions in the literature, natural resource dependence is measured as the ratio of mineral exports to total exports and a country is considered mineral dependent if mineral exports constitute more than 25 percent of a country's total exports. This is consistent with the IMF's definition of export dependence.
Another potentially important variable is foreign aid. In the conflict literature Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify diaspora and their impact on conflict through flows of funds that can support insurrection. In the growth literature recent developments have considered the impact of aid on developing countries, with no consensus. Burnside & Dollar (2000) concluded that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good policies (fiscal, monetary and trade) and no impact in the presence of poor policies. On the other hand, Easterly, Levine & Roodman (2004) and Hansen & Tarp (2000) rebut Burnside & Dollar (2000) 's claim and find that aid works for countries with poor policies. While there is no consensus regarding the impact of aid on growth, it is recognised that aid fungibility can result in discretionary spending. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that the impact of military spending may differ between countries that are net aid recipients and those that are nonrecipients.
A final issue that has been highlighted in the literature is the impact of openness of economies on growth. There is no consensus, with proponents of trade openness having a positive effect on development including Edwards (1997) , Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2004) and those finding that find trade openness has a negative effect on growth including Yanikkaya (2002) , with Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) finding little evidence that open trade policies are associated with economic growth. There is also a substantial literature on trade and conflict, suggesting that countries that trade are less likely to fight (Polachek, 2007) . In addition, involvement in the arms trade can impact upon economic growth for a given level of military expenditure (Yakovlev, 2007) . In 2011, according to SIPRI, the top 7 suppliers or arms in the world (USA, Russia, Germany, France, China, UK, Italy) are also within the top 10 of the world's top military spenders. The majority of the world's economies are arms importers; hence, a more open economy could represent greater net arms imports than the equivalent closed economy. This represents an opportunity cost since the resources used for arms imports could be used for developmental purposes. penness variable is calculated by taking the sum of a country's imports and exports and dividing that by its GDP, with a country considered open if it is above the value for the world average and vice versa for a closed economy.
Modelling Military Spending and Growth
For the empirical analysis the model developed by Dunne et al (2005) is used, whereby the effect of military spending on economic growth is based on the augmented Solow growth 5 model with Harrod-neutral technical progress, similar to Knight et al (1996) . The key assumption within this exogenous growth model is that military spending share m=M/Y affects factor productivity via a level effect on the efficiency parameter, which controls Harrod-neutral technical change. Putting it differently, a permanent change in m does not affect the long-run steady-state growth rate, but has the potential to have a permanent effect on per capita income along the steady-state growth path. The share of military spending can also affect the transitory growth rates along the path to the new steady-state equilibrium.
The starting point of the model is an aggregate Neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function featuring Harrod-neutral technological progress.
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Where Y denotes aggregate real income, K is the real capital stock, L is labour and A is the technology parameter evolving according to:
where g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress and m is the share of military expenditure in total output (GDP). Together with the standard Solow model assumptions of an exogenous savings rate s, constant labour force growth rate n and constant rate of depreciation δ; one can display the dynamics of physical capital accumulation by:
where = denotes the effective capital-labour ratio and α is the constant capitaloutput elasticity. The steady-state level of is:
where the asterisk denotes the steady-state value of the variable. It is now possible to solve for the steady-state value of output. Linearising (3) via a truncated Taylor series expansion around the steady-state 1 and substituting (4) we get:
and since = = then:
1 Re-writing (3) in the form = ( ), = , the linearised form is
where the steady-state level of output per effective worker is:
Equation (6) estimates the transitory dynamics of output per effective worker in the neighbourhood of the steady-state. Following Dunne et al (2005) , (6) is integrated forward from t-1 to t giving:
Now using equations (2), (7) and (8), is related to observable per capita income y=Y/L via:
where z is still equivalent to (α-1)(n+g+δ), while θ is the elasticity of steady-state income with respect to the long-run military expenditure share. Equation (9) provides the basis for the empirical analysis Dunne et al (2005) suggest that the dynamic panel model specification can now be written in the form: where = = the gross investment/GDP, = ( , + + ) = labour force growth rate plus ( + ) which is a constant, assumed to be equal to 0.05 2 , = , which is equal to military spending as a share of GDP, = , and = , which is the lagged variable of military spending and gross investment as a share of GDP respectively. The variable reflects the time specific effects, represents group specific effects and , is the error term. We also follow from Knight et al (1993) , Islam (1995) and Dunne (2011) in treating s and n as variant across countries and time; while taking g and δ to be constant and exogenous across time and country. 7
Data Description
The balanced panel is composed of annual data for 104 countries covering the period 1988-2010. This includes all countries that had a maximum of three missing observations for the military expenditure variable. Military expenditure as a share of GDP was taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI). Other economic variables, real per capita GDP (growth), gross-fixed capital formation as a share of GDP (used as a measurement of capital) were taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database (WDI). Due to difficulties in obtaining reliable data for the average growth rate of the labour force, the working-age population growth is used. Classifications of countries that are either developed or non-developed and income groupings are also taken from the WDI 3 . In order to homogenise the sample size for the different income groupings, the low and low-middle income countries were combined to form low-income countries, while highmiddle income countries were defined as middle-income and the high-income definition left unchanged. The conflict indicator was taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) database. A country is given a numerical value of one if it has experienced a conflict between the periods 1988-2010. A civil war and interstate war variable was constructed, dividing countries into those that had experienced either a civil war or interstate war.
Natural resource abundance was measured by mineral exports as share of total exports, using data from Hagland (2011) and UNCTADstat. The focus was on the six types of fuels and non-fuel minerals as defined by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes shown in Table 1 . Aid was taken from the World Banks WDI, by dividing the sample into countries that are net recipients of aid compared to those that aren't. As the net recipients of aid is measured as a share of GDP any country that on average received less than 0.01 percent of aid as a share of GDP was considered as non-aid recipients. Aid recipients were then divided further into countries that receive low (less than 1% of GDP), medium (between 1% and 3% of GDP) and high amounts of aid (greater than 3% of GDP). 
Empirical Analysis
In undertaking the empirical analysis of military spending and growth a major problem has been poor data quality and the lack of exogenous variation within the data. However, since the end of the Cold War, data quality and leverage has improved and the developments of panel data techniques has helped overcome limited exogenous variation in the data ; Dunne et al (2004) ). Panel data methods such as simple fixed effects, random effects and random coefficient estimators have been increasingly used and as longer timeseries data becomes available dynamic specifications have been introduced into panel data methods . This has raised a number of issues, as in the following example of a simple bivariate dynamic model:
11. y it = α i + β x jt-1 + λ y jt-1 + u it a fixed effects estimator would suffer from lagged dependent variable (y it-1 ) bias, which biases the OLS estimator (coefficient of x it-1 ) downwards. It is also not consistent as N (number of groups) goes to infinity for fixed T. It is, however, consistent as T goes to infinity and where T is large the bias will be relatively small. There is further heterogeneity bias when the parameters differ over the groups, but this can be dealt with by estimating each equation individually and taking an average of the individual estimates. In the case of positive serial correlation in the independent variables, the resultant heterogeneity bias will bias the estimates of λ upwards.
As the data available is not long enough to use large-N and large-T methods a dynamic model is specified and fixed effects is used to estimate it. For the long-run estimates the overall biases are likely to offset each other due to the estimates of β (downwards) and λ (upwards) working in opposite directions . The estimated general firstorder dynamic model takes the form of:
12. , = , + ∑ , , + + + , ; = 1,2, … , ; = 1,2, … , where y is GDP per capita; x is gross investment/GDP; x is military spending/GDP; x is the labour force growth rate or (n+g+δ). The re-parameterised general first order dynamic model is then estimated and the results are presented in Table 3 , where all variables are in logs, c represents the change in the variable and the dependent variable is (cly), representing the change in per capita GDP. These results show a very well-defined empirical model; all the variables are statistically significant with signs as expected and a clear negative relationship (short and long-run) between military expenditure and economic growth 7 .
Considering possible heterogeneity in the sample, Table 3 also provides estimation results for developed and non-developed countries, giving results which are similar to the full sample. The non-developed country group there is a negative and significant relation between military expenditure and economic growth in the short and long run, while for the developed countries there is a negative and significant short run effect but no long-run effect. (2012) and Pieroni (2006) argue, the effect of military expenditure may well be very different for countries with different income levels, suggesting a non linear relation. To consider such differences, the full sample was stratified into three different income groups, giving the results in Table 4 . The empirical growth model is generally well specified across the groups. For all three income groups the effect of military burden on growth is negative and significant in the short-run, but only evident in the low and high-income countries in the long run 8 . . Previous studies, particularly in Africa, have found differences in the military spending growth relation for countries in conflict and those not (Dunne, 2012) , but the results here do not support this. Breaking the full sample into groups of countries that have experienced conflict (38) and those that have not (66) gave the results in Table 5 , which show significant negative effects of military expenditure both in the short and long-run irrespective of whether a country has experienced conflict. It is possible that the type of conflict may be more relevant so Table 5 also reports results for countries that experienced civil conflicts and those that experienced interstate conflicts. This gave 33 countries experiencing civil conflict and 11 interstate conflict, with 6 countries experiencing both 9 . The estimation results for countries with civil war experiences (Column 3, Table 5 ) were consistent with the overall sample, conflict and no-conflict groups, with significant negative short and long-run effects of military burden 13 Conflict could have a different effect on countries at different income levels, so to investigate this the 38 countries that have experienced conflict, were grouped into lowincome, medium-income; and high-income countries. Due to the lack of observations for the medium and high-income groups the results show be analysed with caution 10 . While column 1 shows negative and significant short and long-run effects, column 2 shows insignificant effects for medium income countries experiencing conflict, but column 3 is consistent with column 1. Interestingly, the coefficient (on clm) is more than 3 times larger than that for the conflict affected low-income countries and larger than the overall conflict and civil war sample and the long-run coefficient (on lm1) is twice as large as the low-income conflict affected countries and more than 3 times greater than the overall conflict and civil war group. This suggests that military spending can have a particularly damaging impact on growth in high income countries involved in conflict. To consider the possible impact of natural resource differences, the UNCTADstat database was used to divide the sample into 43 countries that are resource dependent and 61 countries that are not resource dependent. Table 7 , shows that military burden has negative and significant short and long-run effects of similar size for both for countries with and without natural resource abundance 11 . In the rationale for stratifying for natural resource abundance an indirect hypothesis was that that resource rich countries spend on average more on military than non-resource rich countries 12 . Estimates of the means showed that resource rich countries allocate on average 3.4 percent of their GDP to military expenditure, while non-resource rich countries spend only 2.3 percent of their GDP on the military. This difference of 1.1 percentage points is statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates suggest that even though on average natural resource abundant countries spend more on military then non-natural resource abundant countries, the negative effect is less for the resource abundant countries. This could mean that resources abundance makes military burden more affordable. To consider if there was any difference in the type of resources, the group was broken down into those that are resource rich in fuel and those rich in non-fuel minerals, giving the results in 12 See page 7, under natural resources. 16 columns 3 and 4. These show clear differences 13 , with the results for the fuel resource rich countries consistent with the general results, but the non fuel results showing military spending to have no effect on growth in the long or short run. This would suggest that the oil economies in the natural resource sample are driving the negative effects of military burden in overall estimates of natural resource abundant countries.
Moving to consider the possible impact of aid, Table 8 shows the results for countries that receive aid and those that do not and the stratifies those that receive aid into low, medium and high aid recipients. The results show negative significant short and long-run effect of military burden irrespective of whether a country receives foreign aid. This also holds for countries receiving medium and high levels of aid, but not for those receiving low levels of aid. Furthermore, the negative coefficients of the short-run (clm) and long-run (lm1) military burden increases in size as we move higher up the levels of aid received Finally, the impact of openness is considered 14 . As the degree of openness could change both the opening and closing value of exports plus imports as a share of GDP was used as a check for consistency, but the results shown in Table 9 were very similar. The results showed negative and significant effects for military spending on growth in both the short and long-run, albeit only at the ten percent level in the short run for closed economies in year 2000. The mean estimates for military burden for the open economies for the years 2000 and 2009 were 2.8 and 3.0 percent respectively, which were about one half a per cent of GDP greater than the closed economies. Despite these differences, both groups showed significant adverse effects of military burden on growth. 
Conclusion
Military spending by governments is indeed important in the influence it has, especially when it leads or facilitates conflict. As a result the economic impact of such spending is of great concern. This paper develops and analyses a comprehensive post-cold war balanced panel dataset for the period 1988-2010, using the modelling framework suggested by Dunne et al (2005) and considering possible sample heterogeneities and nonlinearities. The estimation results using the dynamic first order model with fixed effects provided surprisingly strong support for the negative impact of military burden on growth for both the short and long-run.
When countries were grouped as developed and developing only the long-run effect for the developed countries was insignificant. Consistent results were observed when countries were broken into three income groups, with the short-run coefficient estimate negative and significant for all three groups and the long-run coefficient estimate negative and significant for the low income and the high income groups.
While military spending on growth for conflict or non-conflict affected countries was both negative and significant, the expected differences in the effects of military burden on growth in civil and interstate wars was not apparent. When the type of conflict was considered, both civil and interstate wars groups showed negative and significant effect of military spending on growth, though further stratification by income led to insignificant results for medium income countries that had experienced conflict. Similarly consistent results were found when grouping countries by their natural resource endowments, aid dependence and trade openness.
These results do seem to provide valuable robustness checks and support strongly the view that military spending has an adverse effect on growth. It does seem as though post Cold War it is possible to see this result developing as a consensus view. But while a compelling conclusion can be drawn across countries, care is needed in applying the conclusion to individual countries, as some groupings of countries did differ, for example non-fuel natural resource abundance, low aid recipient countries showed no effect of military spending on growth. There is, however, certainly no evidence of any significant positive effects.
